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CHANGE IS IN THE WIND:
SELF-DETERMINATION AND WIND
POWER THROUGH TRIBAL ENERGY
RESOURCE AGREEMENTS
Kathleen R. Unger*
The United States currently faces an energy supply crisis, problems of
climate change and environmental degradation, and national security
concerns attributable to the reliance on fossil fuels. Wind power can
play a significant role in addressing these issues. Wind resources on
Native American lands have great potential as part of a national
solution. At the same time, harnessing tribal wind power can address
the need for sustainable and environmentally sound economic
development on tribal lands. To successfully meet these needs, tribal
wind resource development must enhance tribal control under the
principle of self-determination. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included
a provision designed to allow self-determined development of tribal
natural resources through tribal energy resource agreements (TERAs),
which will allow tribes to enter into leases and other business
agreements for resource development without the otherwise-required
federal approval process. However, the TERA framework falls short, in
various ways, of its promise of putting control of resource development
into tribal hands. Wind resource development is free of many concerns
raised by the development of traditional energy resources, such as
environmental harms and erosion of the federal trust responsibility
toward tribes. The use of TERAs for wind power projects may, along
with statutory changes, allow for self-determined tribal resource
development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On Earth Day 2009, President Barack Obama exhorted the
public, "[I]t is time for us to lay a new foundation for economic
growth by beginning a new era of energy exploration in America."'
He called for a new energy economy based on renewable sources and
technologies, with the aim of creating jobs, enhancing energy
security, and protecting the planet from climate change. Wind
power is now the fastest-growing energy source worldwide and will
be central in developing the new energy economy to achieve these
ends.3 One major source of wind power is the wind that blows across
Native American tribal lands, which could provide an abundant
source of energy to help meet national needs.'
Developing these resources can not only help in the new
American energy economy but can also meet needs of the tribes that
own the resources by providing a means of sustainable economic
development.5  To fulfill this goal, however, wind power




3. William Moomaw, Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 2008
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING MEETING ON RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES 3, 4 (Olav Hohmeyer & Tom Trittin eds.), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/special-reports/srren.pdf.
4. Kevin L. Shaw & Richard D. Deutsch, Wind Power and Other Renewable Energy
Projects: The New Wave of Power Project Development on Indian Lands, NATURAL RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found., Westminster, Colo.),
Nov. 10-11, 2005, at 9-3.
This Note refers to American Indians and tribes by a variety of terms, recognizing the lack
of a clear consensus regarding preferred terminology. See Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between
Self-Determination and the Trust Doctrine: Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58
ARK. L. REV. 291, 291 n.2 (2005). The term "tribe" predominates here because it is the statutorily
accepted term for an Indian community or governmental entity as used in federal law. See 25
U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2006). The discussion generally uses the term "tribal lands" to refer to lands
defined as "Indian lands" in Title 25, Chapter 37, of the U.S. Code. Id. § 3501(2). However, land
title is a complex issue in Indian law, and this Note does not address the complexities of
ownership that may affect development on lands controlled by tribes or individual Indians. See
Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over
Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 544-52 (1993) [hereinafter Royster, Mineral
Development] (discussing how land tenure patterns affect tribal mineral ownership). Finally, this
Note does not consider issues specific to Alaska Native groups, which are governed in part under
a distinct legal framework. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 905-11 (4th ed. 1998).
5. DEAN B. SUAGEE, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, ISSUE BRIEF 10,
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY: OPTIONS FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS (1998),
http://www.repp.org/repp-pubs/pdf/issuebrlO.pdf [hereinafter SUAGEE, RENEWABLE ENERGY].
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development on tribal lands must take an approach that enhances
tribal control, rather than federal control, over the management of
tribal resources. 6 This approach must be compatible with the
principle of tribal self-determination, which posits that tribes should
control their own social, governmental, and economic development.7
Congress recently enacted a federal legal framework that provides
tribes an option for increasing their control over resource
development projects, through tribal-federal agreements called
"tribal energy resource agreements" (TERAs).s Though the TERA
framework falls short of allowing full tribal control over natural
resource development, wind power offers the best opportunity for
TERAs to advance tribal self-determination in this arena.
This Note examines issues related to self-determination and
tribal control of resource development under the TERA structure, as
played out in the context of tribal wind power. Part II summarizes
the importance of developing tribal wind power to meet national
energy and environmental needs as well as tribal economic and
environmental needs. Part III discusses the principle of tribal self-
determination and obstacles to its realization. Part IV provides an
overview of the legal structure governing tribal wind power,
including the TERA legislation and regulations. Part V presents a
critique of the TERA framework, arguing that it does not foster tribal
self-determination to the extent that it should. Part VI proposes that
wind power offers an opportunity for self-determined resource
development and suggests various changes to the TERA structure to
help achieve this goal. Part VII offers concluding thoughts regarding
the potential of TERAs to promote wind power development on
tribal lands in accord with the principle of self-determination.
II. TRIBAL WIND POWER AS A SOLUTION
TO NATIONAL AND TRIBAL NEEDS
Wind power is a major component in developing a new energy
system nationwide. Turning from conventional energy sources to
wind and other renewable resources will mitigate environmental and
health effects related to fossil fuels. Wind power offers great
6. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part HI.
8. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e); see infra Part LV.B.
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potential for replacing conventional fuels for electricity, and tribal
wind resources can play a significant role in this endeavor. Not only
can tribal wind power projects contribute to the national energy
solution, but they can also meet tribal needs for environmentally
sustainable economic development.
A. The Imminent Need for Alternative Energy
Sources and the Promise of Wind Power
Developing wind power will address a variety of crucial national
and global concerns.9 The foremost of these are global warming and
other environmental effects of burning fossil fuels. 10 Most electricity
in the United States is produced from coal and natural gas, leading to
greenhouse gas emissions. "l The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, an international scientific body affiliated with the United
Nations, has reported that the buildup of greenhouse gases is the
major cause of global warming.12 Global warming leads to
environmental effects including drought, flooding, rising sea levels,
coastal erosion, ecosystem collapse, and an increased likelihood of
mass extinctions, as well as harms to humans such as population
dislocations and malnutrition. "
Halting global warming will require forceful action. Experts
suggest that dramatic changes must be made within the next ten
years to avoid passing the point of no return. 14 One estimate suggests
the need to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to more than 50
percent below 1990 levels by the year 2050. 15 Additionally, fossil
fuel extraction and energy production cause environmental
9. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, WIND POWER OUTLOOK 2008 1 (2008), http://www.awea.
org/pubs/documents/Outlook_2008.pdf.
10. See id. at 6.
11. Robert Gough, Tribal Wind Power Development in the Northern Great Plains, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 57, 59.
12. Moomaw, supra note 3.
13. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7, 11-12 (Martin Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
14. Al Gore, Speech on Renewable Energy (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=92638501 [hereinafter Gore Speech].
15. Climate Change Research Centre, 2007 Bali Climate Declaration by Scientists, http://
www.ccrc.unsw.edu.au/news/2007/Bali.html (last updated May 5, 2009).
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contamination and public health consequences such as respiratory
disease. 16 Added to these concerns are the economic and national
security costs of importing fossil fuels from other nations at unstable
prices. 17
Low- and no-carbon alternatives will play a key role in
addressing the critical issues related to fossil fuel energy. , The use
of wind power has been growing dramatically, and wind can take a
leading position in the new energy system. ," In 2008, the U.S. wind
power industry experienced 50 percent growth, making the United
States the global leader in wind energy generation. 20
Replacing fossil fuels with wind energy makes sense because
wind is an inexhaustible resource; also, because wind is free, the
price of wind power does not depend on fuel costs that can lead to
price spikes. 21 The Western Governors' Association projects that if
its policy recommendations are implemented, wind power could be
the lowest-cost energy resource in the western United States. 22 Wind
is also an abundant resource: estimates indicate that wind resources
in the Midwest alone could meet the United States' total electricity
needs. 23
Wind power raises some concerns about its negative
environmental effects, which primarily involve visual impacts, noise,
and harm to birds and bats. 24 However, it is possible to minimize
these effects through careful siting of wind turbines and other
16. Dave Newman, Feature Article, Empowering the Wind: Overcoming Obstacles to Wind
Energy Development in the United States, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Summer/Fall 2003, at
5,5.
17. Gore Speech, supra note 14. President Obama recently remarked that oil imports
represent 20 percent of total U.S. imports. Obama, supra note 1.
18. Moomaw, supra note 3.
19. Id.
20. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, ANNUAL WIND INDUSTRY REPORT 2 (2009), available at
http://www.awea.org/publications/reports/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.pdf.
21. Gough, supra note 11, at 59.
22. WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, CLEAN ENERGY, A STRONG ECONOMY AND A
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 16 (2006), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/
CDEAC06.pdf.
23. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future of Renewable
Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 519 (2008).
24. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy Development: Environmental Benefits and
Impacts, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/benefits-impacts.html (last updated
Mar. 13, 2009).
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21mitigation measures. Moreover, wind power poses far fewer
negative effects than fossil fuels do, and the advantages of wind
power far outweigh those concerns.26
B. The Role of Tribal Wind Resources and
Their Potential to Meet Tribal Needs
Tribal lands have substantial wind resources. The Energy
Information Administration has identified almost one hundred
reservations with winds great enough for energy development
projects. 27 Reservations on the Great Plains offer approximately 200
gigawatts of wind power potential-roughly one-third of the
electrical capacity of the entire nation. " These tribal lands offer the
additional advantage of having single landowners over large land
areas, allowing development without the need to enter into
agreements with many different owners. 29
Tribes can address several issues through the development of
wind power on their lands. One concern raised by advocates of tribal
wind power is the need for sustainable economic development. "
Despite federal assistance for tribal economic development over the
past several decades, 3 the people living on many U.S. tribal
25. Newman, supra note 16, at 9; NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE,
MITIGATION TOOLBOX (2007), available at http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/publications/
Mitigation_- Toolbox.pdf. Selective siting can also address religious and other cultural impacts.
U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy Development: The Impacts of an Energy Project,
http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/energy-project-impacts.html (last updated Mar.
16, 2009).
26. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 509.
27. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL ON INDIAN LANDS 28 (2000), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/ilands/ilands.pdf. Issues regarding access to the
transmission grid and distance from load centers play into how appropriate development is at a
particular location. Indian Energy Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
110th Cong. 47 (2008) (prepared statement of Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian
Energy and Economic Development, Dep't of the Interior); Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 527.
However, these issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
28. Gough, supra note 11, at 57.
29. Mark Shahinian, Special Feature, The Tax Man Cometh Not: How the Non-
Transferability of Tax Credits Harms Indian Tribes, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 267, 271
(2007-2008).
30. Michael L. Connolly, Commercial Scale Wind Industry on the Campo Indian
Reservation, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2008, at 25, 28; Gough, supra note 11, at 62.
31. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 21.04 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2005).
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reservations suffer from extreme poverty. 3 2 Unemployment rates, at
approximately 50 percent, are about ten times higher than the
national average, while per capita income is significantly lower. "
Moreover, basic infrastructure-such as plumbing and sewer
systems, electricity, and paved roadways-is often lacking. "
However, reservation populations have the benefit of the tribal
lands they live on, which are a crucial economic resource for most
tribes. 35 Land and other natural resources can provide opportunities
for economic development. 36 Among the natural resources the tribal
land base offers is wind.37 A productive and sustainable economy
based on wind can help address the poverty and related social issues
currently confronting tribes.38
Developing tribal wind power can also address tribes'
environmental concerns. Much past resource development on tribal
lands has involved the extraction of coal, oil, gas, and uranium.39
Energy mineral exploration and production activities on tribal lands
have caused environmental effects including air, water, and soil
contamination, as well as erosion and flooding. 4 Wind power offers
32. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do?
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2, 3 (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., UCLA Am. Indian Studies Ctr. 1992).
33. Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and Barriers to Tribal
Capital Market Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 952-53 (2008) [hereinafter Clarkson,
Wall Street Indians].
34. Id.
35. Richmond L. Clow & Imre Sutton, Prologue: Tribes, Trusteeship, and Resource
Management, in TRUSTEESHIP IN CHANGE: TOWARD TRIBAL AUTONOMY IN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, at xxix, xxxvi (Richmond L. Clow & Imre Sutton eds., 2001) (referring to
"[t]ribes' dependence on a resource base and territorial locus"); Mary Christina Wood, The Indian
Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief
Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 356 (2003) ("[T]he land base is the linchpin
for tribal survival.").
36. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, § 15.01.
37. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
38. See David H. Getches, Foreword to TRUSTEESHIP IN CHANGE: TOWARD TRIBAL
AUTONOMY IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, at xiii, xiii (Richmond L. Clow & Imre Sutton eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Getches, Foreword].
39. SUAGEE, RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 5.
40. Royster, Mineral Development, supra note 4, at 614-15. One particularly intractable
example is uranium mining on the Navajo Reservation: radioactive soil and mine tailings, and
water in abandoned pit mines, have led to diseases including lung, stomach, ovarian, and breast
cancer, respiratory disease, and Navajo neuropathy. Judy Pasternak, A Peril That Dwelt Among
the Navajos, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, at Al; Judy Pasternak, Oases in Navajo Desert
Contained "a Witch's Brew," L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at Al. See Mary Christina Wood,
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an alternative form of development without air pollution or solid and
hazardous wastes. " Thus, wind provides an opportunity for
economic development that is nonpolluting and sustainable over the
long term. 42
To meet these goals, however, tribal resource development must
also promote self-determination through tribal control over
development projects. Economic development on tribal lands
succeeds best where control over the development activity is in tribal
hands rather than in the hands of the federal government or another
outsider. 4" Past federal policies tended to place control in the hands
of the federal government or non-Indian developers. 44 For example,
in the past, the federal government was entirely in charge of deciding
the course of natural resource development on tribal lands. 4' The
government often accomplished this development through lease
agreements with outsiders, initially for grazing and mining, and later
for other mineral development processes as well. 46 The royalty
payments to tribes under these leases were low, and tribes were
unable to negotiate for better lease terms, leaving them at a
disadvantage. 4I More generally, the federal government retained the
ability to direct the course of development under these policies. 48
Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 1471, 1481-96, for additional examples of environmental contamination resulting from
energy development and hazardous waste storage on and near tribal lands.
41. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 523-24.
42. Gough, supra note 11, at 58.
43. Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Economic
Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 619 (2004). Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt have done
extended research on tribal economic development as part of the Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development. They note, "After fifteen years of research and work in Indian
Country, we cannot find a single case of sustained economic development in which an entity
other than the Indian nation is making the major decisions about development strategy, resource
use, or internal organization." STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, JOINT OCCASIONAL
PAPERS ON NATIVE AFF. NO. 2005-02, TwO APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS: ONE WORKS, THE OTHER DOESN'T 14 (2006), available at
http://www.jopna.net/pubs/jopna 2005-02_Approaches.pdf.
44. See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065,
1071-75 (2008) [hereinafter Royster, Practical Sovereignty].
45. Id. at 1072.
46. Id. at 1072-73.
47. Id. at 1074.
48. Id.
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More recently, a shift in federal policy has lessened the extreme
federal control over tribal resource development. The doctrine of
self-determination, which has guided much of federal policy toward
American Indians over the past decades, acknowledges that giving
tribes control over how their resources are developed is the best way
to improve economic self-sufficiency and to strengthen tribal
governmental and economic structures.49 Thus, promoting self-
determination should be a central consideration in the development
of tribal energy resources.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
AND OBSTACLES TO ITS REALIZATION
The doctrine of self-determination has its roots in tribal
sovereignty long recognized in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.50
The notion of tribal sovereignty acknowledges the power and right of
tribes to self-governance. 5 Juxtaposed with this notion is a federal
assertion that the U.S. government has power over tribes, which
extends to the power to destroy tribal sovereignty. 52 The tension
49. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with Self-
Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility
in the Twenty-First Century, NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY (Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Found., Westminster, Colo.), Nov. 10-11, 2005, at 13A-l; infra Part III.
Even today under the policy of self-determination, tribes suffer from many disadvantages in
developing their resources and economies. Lack of access to capital markets occurs through
limitations on tribal tax-exempt bonding authority, Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory
Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009,
1014-17 (2007), and other statutory, regulatory, and informational barriers, Clarkson, Wall Street
Indians, supra note 33, at 954-55, 957-59. Also, federal jurisprudence allows state taxation of
activities by non-Indians on tribal lands. Angelique A. EagleWoman, The Philosophy of
Colonization Underlying Taxation Imposed upon Tribal Nations Within the United States, 43
TULSA L. REV. 43, 55-61 (2007). This creates a burden on economic activity on tribal lands, thus
hindering economic development. Id. at 50, 58. For example, the state of Wyoming taxes oil and
gas production on the Eastern Shoshone Tribe's land at 14 percent. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency
Act and the Native American Energy Development and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S.
424 and S. 522 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 82 (2003) (statement of
Vernon Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council). When the state tax is combined
with the tribe's 8 percent tax, the total tax burden creates a disincentive for resource development.
Id. Similarly, the wind power project on the Campo Kumeyaay lands in San Diego County is
subject to county taxes. Connolly, supra note 30, at 28. The result is "a draw of tax dollars from
the tribal economy to an adjacent jurisdiction." Id.
50. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (recognizing the Cherokee
Nation as a sovereign state).
51. Rosser, supra note 4, at 343.
52. Robert Laurence, American Indians and the Environment: A Legal Primer for
Newcomers to the Field, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1993, at 3, 4.
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between these principles informs considerations of tribal self-
determination and federal control, both with respect to tribal
economic development in general and with respect to the
development of tribal natural resources, including wind power. "
The history of federal policy toward Native American tribes
reflects an ebb and flow between tribal sovereignty and federal
control. 14 The policy of self-determination has held sway since the
1960s, based on a renewed recognition of tribal sovereignty and a
desire for reforms to address the needs of ethnic and racial
minorities. " The central idea of the policy promoting self-
determination is that tribes can serve as governmental units that
provide services to their members. 56
In 1970, President Richard Nixon issued a message to Congress
formally articulating the self-determination policy:
The time has come to break decisively with the past and to
create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian
53. See infra Parts V, VI. Another closely related tension is that between the political
branches' assertions of support for tribal sovereignty through the policy of self-determination,
discussed immediately below, and the Supreme Court's recent contrary tendency to limit tribal
sovereignty. Striking examples include limits on tribes' jurisdiction over non-Indians in both
criminal and civil contexts and limits on tribes' ability to hold the federal government liable in
damages for breaches of trust. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding
that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001) (limiting civil jurisdiction over non-Indians to narrow circumstances); Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008) (further limiting civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians); United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation 1), 537 U.S. 488
(2003) (limiting the circumstances under which damages suits against the federal government can
prevail); United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I1), 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009) (same). For
more information about the Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence, see ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).
54. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, §§ 1.01, 1.06. Cohen
identifies four periods in the history of federal policy between the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution and the present-day policy of self-determination. From 1789 to 1871, federal Indian
policy involved treaty making with the aim of obtaining tribal lands but generally allowing tribes
autonomy in internal matters. Id. § 1.03. In 1871, Congress halted treaty making with tribes, and
until 1928, federal policy attempted to assimilate American Indians into "civilized" society; the
primary means was to break up tribally owned landholdings into individual allotments,
sometimes accompanied by terminating tribal status. Id. § 1.04. From 1928 to 1942, policy
shifted away from assimilation and back toward sovereignty, as epitomized by the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006), which restored sovereignty and
encouraged self-governance and economic development. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, § 1.05. From 1943 to 1961, policy returned to assimilation, through
termination of federal recognition of tribal status. Id. § 1.06.
55. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, § 1.07.
56. Id.
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future is determined by Indian acts and Indian
decisions....
... [T]he Federal government needs Indian energies
and Indian leadership if its assistance is to be effective in
improving the conditions of Indian life. It is a new and
balanced relationship between the United States
government and the first Americans that is at the heart of
our approach to Indian problems. "
Two major legislative enactments implemented the self-
determination policy: the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA)5" and the Tribal Self-Governance
Act of 1994. " These two acts aimed to put control over the course of
social, governmental, and economic development into tribal hands by
providing federal funding for tribes to deliver health and education
services and to administer programs to promote economic
development. 6 One illustrative success story involves forest
resources." During the 1980s, forty-nine tribes increased their roles
in the management of their forestry resources under the ISDEAA. 62
Under tribal control, forestry productivity and profits increased
significantly. 63 This example shows the power of tribal control over
economic development.
However, a variety of obstacles to the ideal of self-determination
hinder tribal control. These include a tension with the trust doctrine,
as well as conflicts of interest with the federal government and
bureaucratic resistance to tribes' taking over control of federal
programs and activities. The trust doctrine recognizes a federal
responsibility toward tribes and individual Indians and toward the
land and resource assets that the federal government holds in trust for
57. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564, 565, 576 (July 8,
1970).
58. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-458).
59. Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. II, 108 Stat. 4270 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-1,
458aa-458hh).
60. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, § 1.07.
61. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1070.
62. Id.
63. Id. Output increased by up to 40 percent, and the prices tribes received increased by up
to 6 percent. Id.
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them. 6 This doctrine goes hand in hand with the federal recognition
of tribal sovereignty but acknowledges that federal power over tribes
creates a federal responsibility to protect tribal rights. 65
The trust relationship originated in treaties between tribes and
the federal government.66 These treaties created a "sacred trust"
relationship, including a promise that the federal government would
protect tribes in exchange for the tribes relinquishing lands to the
United States. 67 As a doctrine of federal Native American law, the
trust doctrine lies on the foundation of three cases from the era of
Chief Justice John Marshall.68 These cases together establish the
principles that the federal government holds legal title to tribal lands,
while tribes have possessory rights;69 that tribes are dependent
nations rather than fully independent sovereignties; 7 and that though
tribes retain sovereignty over their own governance, they rely on the
federal government for protection from harm by states and
individuals. 7
The relationship between the doctrines of trust and self-
determination is complex and in some instances oppositional. The
federal trust responsibility can interfere with the exercise of tribal
self-determination. 7 2 The extent to which this is true depends partly
on how one conceptualizes the trust doctrine. It can be seen as a
64. Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-9.
65. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, § 5.04[4].
66. Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian Trust"
Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 272 (2003)
[hereinafter Tsosie, Conflict].
67. Id. at 273; Wood, supra note 35, at 356-58. This promise of protection took various
forms, including a guarantee to the lands designated for tribal groups, assurances that non-Indians
committing crimes on tribal lands would be subject to punishment, and assistance in the form of
agricultural equipment and domestic animals. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, 1790, in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 25, 25-28 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904), available at
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/creOO25.htm.
68. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579,
593 (2008). The three cases-the "Marshall Trilogy"-are Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See WILLIAMS, supra note 53, at 47-70, for a critique of
the Marshall Trilogy as perpetuating white superiority and discrimination based on stereotypes of
American Indians as "savages."
69. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 585.
70. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 13.
71. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552, 555, 561-62; Tsosie, Conflict, supra note 66, at 273.
72. Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian
Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 902-03 (1998).
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federal duty to protect tribes' right of self-governance and
autonomy,73 or as a way to justify federal power and control over
tribal affairs. " The latter conception relates more closely to the
federal trust responsibility to manage Indian property than to the
responsibility to protect Indian rights to sovereignty and autonomy. 75
A leading example is the case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,76 in which
the Supreme Court held that Congress could divest a tribe of its lands
without tribal members' consent despite a treaty to the contrary. The
Court based its holding on the rationale that Congress's trust
responsibility over the lands gave it "a paramount power over the
property of the Indians."77 Under this interpretation, the trust
doctrine directly interfered with tribal self-determination.
By contrast, since the mid-twentieth century, the trust doctrine
has been used as a source of tribal rights. 78 Tribes and individual
American Indians use the trust doctrine as the ground for bringing
suit against the federal government based on breach of trust.79
73. Tsosie, Conflict, supra note 66, at 274.
74. Id. at 275.
75. Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-11.
76. 187 U.S. 553 (1902).
77. Id. at 565-67.
78. Tsosie, Conflict, supra note 66, at 275-76.
79. See Wood, supra note 35, at 364. Professor Wood distinguishes between suits for
injunctive relief, usually based on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and suits for
damages, based on the Tucker Act or on the Indian Tucker Act. Id. at 361, 364. The latter acts
require a claim to be grounded in an "express source of law," including the U.S. Constitution,
statutes, treaties, and regulations, that creates a right to federal compensation for damages. Id. at
364-65.
The recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the Navajo Nation's breach of trust claims
illustrate the difficulty of prevailing on a claim for damages. United States v. Navajo Nation
(Navajo Nation 1), 537 U.S. 488 (2003); United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I), 129
S. Ct. 1547 (2009). This case involved the federal role in coal lease amendments between the
Navajo Nation and a private company. Navajo Nation 1, 537 U.S. at 493. During negotiations to
amend the royalty rate paid to the Navajo Nation, representatives from the coal company met
privately with the Secretary of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior did not inform the
Navajo Nation that it had determined a royalty rate of 20 percent was appropriate, instead
allowing the parties to renegotiate at a rate of 12.5 percent. Id. at 496-98. Nevertheless, in Navajo
Nation I, the Court held that no provision of the controlling statute or regulations imposed federal
liability for the breach of trust. Id. at 493. Subsequently, in Navajo Nation II, the Court held that
neither any of three other statutes pointed to by the Navajo Nation, nor the federal government's
"comprehensive control" over coal mining on American Indian lands, supported monetary
damages for breach of trust. Navajo Nation II, 129 S. Ct. at 1555-58.
Professor Wood observes, "Trust enforcement under the APA is much broader than under
the Tucker Acts, because there is no requirement of premising a claim on a statute or some other
source of express law." Wood, supra note 35, at 365. Instead, suits seeking injunctions can be
grounded in "broad common law assertions of the trust responsibility." Id. However, she notes
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Indeed, the ability to hold the federal government liable for breach is
at the heart of its trust obligation toward tribes. 8" However, in recent
years, while expanding tribes' ability to take control of business
activities previously managed by the federal government, Congress
has placed limits on federal liability for losses related to those
activities. 8 The TERA framework for resource development
includes such a limitation on liability. 82 This and other enactments
offer specific instances in which an increase in self-determination
comes with a reduction in tribes' ability to hold the federal
government responsible under its trust obligation. 83
Further problems in the exercise of tribal self-determination
derive from federal conflicts of interest and resistance to giving up
control over economic activities on tribal lands. First, the
Department of the Interior (DOI) must conform to both the trust
responsibility toward tribes and a responsibility to protect federal
interests.84 When tribal and public interests collide, a conflict of
interest arises. 8 Such conflicts can emerge in the management of
tribal natural resources. 6 For example, much resource development
requires the DOI to undertake an environmental review process. 7
The government is simultaneously obligated to act in the tribe's best
interests and in the public interest in protecting the environment,
which "introduces non-Indian considerations" into the review of a
resource development project. 88 This conflict can interfere with the
federal trust responsibility toward tribes. 89
that "recent decisions have ignored the different contexts in which trust claims are brought,
applying Tucker Act restrictions to claims brought under the APA." Id. Given the difficulty of
prevailing on damages claims, this confusion creates an "ill-founded barrier" to "claims for
injunctive relief' based on the trust doctrine. Id. at 367.
80. Rosser, supra note 4, at 301.
81. Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-28 to -32.
82. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
83. Rosser, supra note 4, at 336.
84. Porter, supra note 72, at 942.
85. Id.
86. Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and
Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 342 (1995)
[hereinafter Royster, Equivocal Obligations].
87. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
88. Royster, Equivocal Obligations, supra note 86, at 334-42.
89. See id. at 364 ("In determining whether to approve development of tribal mineral
resources, the [Interior] Secretary's obligation is to the tribal mineral owners and not to a
balancing of tribal and public interests.").
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Second, as regulatory activities are transferred from the federal
government to tribes, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
bureaucracy may resist relinquishing control because of self-
interested concerns over losing jobs and power.9" This tendency is
illustrated in the congressional attempt to shift control of programs to
tribes under the ISDEAA. 91 This Act allowed tribes to contract with
the BIA to manage programs previously managed by the BIA. 92 But
the BIA often denied contracting requests,93 and even when the BIA
issued a contract, it dictated the form of program administration and
required the tribe to obtain BIA concurrence in decision making." In
this way, the BIA retained significant control over tribal programs,
and the federal bureaucracy thus greatly limited tribal self-
determination.95 Similarly, when these conflicts arise in federal laws
and regulations governing tribal resource development, they hamper
the ability of tribes to truly take control of development in a self-
determined way. 96
The principle of self-determination informs federal American
Indian policy in general and policy for tribal resource development in
particular. However, the contrary impulse for the government to
assert its power over tribes can be an obstacle to tribal self-
determination even when the government affirms its commitment to
that principle and to increasing tribes' control over the course of
development on their lands.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WIND POWER
DEVELOPMENT ON TRIBAL LANDS
The development of tribal renewable energy resources,
including wind power, is governed primarily by tribal and federal
law. In addition to generally applicable federal law, tribal
90. See Porter, supra note 72, at 942, 966. The BIA is the DOI division most directly
responsible for carrying out federal Native American policies and programs. See COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 3 1, § 5.03.
91. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
92. Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1262-63 (1995).
93. Id. at 1265 n.61.
94. Id. at 1265.
95. See id. at 1264 ("It is important ... not to overstate the freedom the tribes enjoyed from
the dead hand of federal bureaucracy.").
96. See infra Part V.
Fall 2009]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 43:329
development projects often implicate federal approval and
involvement. Concerns about self-determination and obstacles to
development led Congress to enact a new framework for tribal
energy resource development that minimizes the federal role. " This
new framework allows tribes to enter into agreements for
development projects once the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary")
approves a TERA for the tribe.
A. The Preexisting Legal Framework for Renewable
Resource Development on Tribal Lands
The legal framework under which tribal renewable energy
development can take place is shaped more by general provisions for
economic development on tribal lands than by enactments aimed
specifically at energy resource development. This is because past
laws related to developing tribal natural resources focused on
mineral resources.98 By contrast, federal attention to renewable
energy resources has come only much more recently and generally
takes the form of incentives rather than legal requirements. "
Much of the legal framework for tribal economic development is
based on tribal law and corporate documents and varies from tribe to
tribe. 100 These bodies of law serve the same functions as local and
state laws do for development outside tribal lands. '0 For example,
97. 25 U.S.C. § 3504 (2006).
98. Laws for mineral resource development include the 1891 Act, id. § 397 (allowing ten-
year leases for mining on tribal land), the 1909 Act, id. § 396 (allowing leases for mining on
allotted lands), the 1924 and 1927 amendments to the 1891 Act, id. § 398 (allowing leases for oil
and gas mining on reservation land) and id. §§ 398a-398e (allowing leases for oil and gas mining
on reservations created by executive order), the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, id. §§ 396a-
396g (providing for consistent mineral leasing procedures for tribal lands), and the Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1982, id. §§ 2101-2108 (allowing tribes to develop mineral resources
through various business structures including joint ventures, operating and production-sharing
agreements, and lease agreements). See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 31, § 17.03[2].
99. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 532. The electricity generation industry is largely a matter
of private finance and operation and is not federally controlled, and though federal policy
encourages wind power development, no comprehensive national strategy exists. Id.; see also
infra note 125 (summarizing the foremost federal renewable energy incentives).
100. Graham, supra note 43, at 630 & n.219. For more information about tribal corporate
forms-and some difficulties tribes encounter with them-see Angelique EagleWoman, Tribal
Nation Economics: Rebuilding Commercial Prosperity in Spite of US. Trade Restraints-
Recommendations for Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383,
397-404 (2008) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics].
101. See JOHN BUSCH ET AL., NATIVE POWER: A HANDBOOK ON RENEWABLE ENERGY AND
ENERGY EFFICIENCY FOR NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 58 (1998), http://wwwl.eere.
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the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota has an
extensive tribal code composed of approximately seventy chapters. 02
Among its provisions, the code governs corporations and commerce,
business licensing, zoning, taxation, employment rights, and
environmental protection. '03 With respect to wind power projects,
tribal law can govern zoning and project siting requirements,
building codes, worker safety, and project permitting. "o4 Because
wind power projects are a new type of development on tribal lands,
many tribes have not yet developed ordinances to govern them
specifically. 105 Tribes moving into wind power development may
therefore need to develop applicable codes. "06 In addition to these
local legal concerns, utility-scale wind power projects must comply
with generally applicable federal provisions for interconnection to
the electrical grid "o7 and with various federal provisions related to
environmental impacts and the protection of cultural resources. ,o
Depending on the form of the project, wind power projects may
also trigger federal approval requirements. Federal approval derives
from the federal-tribal trust relationship: "o9 the trust obligation's
energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/pdfs/nativepower.pdf. Tribal lands are generally not subject to
regulations of the states in which they are located. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy
Development: State Legal Issues, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/state-legal-
issues.html (last updated June 7, 2007).
102. National Tribal Justice Resource Center, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of the Lake
Traverse Reservation Codes of Law (1998), http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/sisseton-wahpeton_
codeoflawmenu.htm.
103. Id.
104. BUSCH ET AL., supra note 101, at 60; U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy
Development: Tribal Legal Issues, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/tribal legal_
issues.html (last updated June 7, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Energy, Tribal Legal Issues];
U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy Development: Developer Risk Factors,
http://www 1.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/developer-iskfactors.html (last updated June 7,
2007).
105. See Gough, supra note 11, at 61 (discussing the Rosebud Sioux Tribe's experience with
a demonstration wind power project).
106. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Tribal Legal Issues, supra note 104.
107. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy Development: Grid Interconnection
Issues, http://wwwl .eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/interconnectionissues.html (last updated
Nov. 11, 2008).
108. BUSCH ET AL., supra note 101, at 60 (discussing the Endangered Species Act and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy Development: Federal
Legal Issues, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/federal-legal-issues.html (last
updated June 7, 2007) (discussing federal laws for cultural resource protection).
109. Royster, Equivocal Obligations, supra note 86, at 332-33; see supra notes 64-71 and
accompanying text.
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promise of protection calls for federal approval of development
agreements between tribes and non-Indians. "I0 Some statutes related
to tribal programs also explicitly include a requirement of federal
approval. "' For example, one method for tribes to develop
renewable resources is leasing land to non-Indians for renewable
energy projects. The general statutory provision for leases of tribal
land dictates approval by the Secretary. 1"2 Alternatively, tribes can
engage in development projects through their governmental entities
or through corporations, "3 either alone or in partnership with private
entities. "' Even in the absence of a lease, such projects often require
Secretarial approval because they involve contracts related to the use
of tribal lands or convey an interest in tribal lands. 15
Secretarial approval, in turn, implicates the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 16 because approval constitutes
"major Federal action," the trigger for NEPA. "' The federal
government's role thus entails an environmental review under
NEPA, which typically requires that the government prepare an
environmental impact statement addressing the impacts, unavoidable
adverse environmental effects, alternatives, and other related
considerations of the proposed development. 18
The requirement for Secretarial approval often impedes
development by adding delays and complexity to project planning. 119
110. Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-20.
111. See Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1077-78, for a succinct history of
such statutory requirements.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2006).
113. SUAGEE, RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 5.
114. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Guide to Tribal Energy Development: Organizational
Development, http://www I .eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/organizational-development.html
(last updated June 11, 2007) (describing organizations for tribal energy development, including
tribal utilities and other business entities, as well as joint ventures with nontribal entities).
115. Gough, supra note 11, at 62. The requirement of federal approval is tied to contracts for
activities that "encumber" tribal land for seven years or more. 25 U.S.C. § 8 1(b).
116. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); see also Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the Natural
Environmental Policy Act to "Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377, 395
(1991).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Some federal actions may not require an environmental impact
statement. Some actions are categorically excluded, and some others require the completion of an
environmental assessment to determine whether an environmental impact statement is needed.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 31, § 10.08.
119. William V. Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three "S"es: Secretarial
Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 169, 172
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For example, when the Campo Kumeyaay Nation negotiated a lease
arrangement for a wind power project on its lands, the BIA's lack of
familiarity with wind projects led to several months of delay. 120
Some have argued that the approval process also puts tribal projects
at a competitive disadvantage compared with projects on private or
public lands and imposes unnecessary obstacles to resource
development. 121 More significantly, the approval requirement
signifies a paternalistic attitude toward tribes and interferes with
tribal autonomy and self-determination. 122 These concerns
contributed to the passage in 2005 of the new framework for tribal
resource development, 123 which was meant to streamline
development by eliminating the federal approval requirement for
resource development projects. 124
B. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Its New TERA
Framework for Tribal Resource Development
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the "2005 Act") is omnibus
legislation with eighteen titles related to various aspects of federal
energy policy, including incentives for renewable energy
development. 125 Title V of the 2005 Act (the "Indian Energy Act") is
(1994); see also Indian Energy Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of Marcus D. Wells, Jr., Chairman, Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation) (noting the harm caused to the tribe by delays and "other
bureaucratic hurdles" in a lease approval).
120. Connolly, supra note 30, at 26 ("Since no commercial lease for wind energy production
had been done in Indian country, the realty personnel at the BIA had nothing to use as a
benchmark to determine if the tribe was getting a fair value in the deal. It took several months of
discussion with the BIA before an approval was finally granted.").
121. Tim Vollman, Indian Energy Title Offers Provocative Schemes for Tribal Development,
NATIVE AM. RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Section of Env't, Energy, and Res., Chi.,
I11.), Feb. 2004, at 3, 3, http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/nativeamerican/newsletter/
feb04/nativeamerres204.pdf; see also Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: A
Step Toward Self-Determination, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2007, at 55, 56 (David
S. May ed.) [hereinafter Shipps, Step].
122. Vollman, supra note 121.
123. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
124. Vollman, supra note 121.
125. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005); see, e.g., tit. II, 119 Stat. 650-83 (Renewable
Energy). Significant renewable energy incentives created or extended in the 2005 Act include the
production tax credit, 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006), which provides a credit per unit of renewable
energy produced; the renewable energy production incentive, 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2006), which
provides a comparable direct incentive for nontaxable entities; and clean renewable energy bonds,
26 U.S.C. § 54, which allow a bond issuer to receive tax-free financing by allowing bond holders
a federal tax credit in lieu of interest paid by the issue. The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 extended and expanded the production tax credit and new clean renewable energy
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dedicated to tribal energy development. 126 The Indian Energy Act
aims to meet the goals of energy development and self-determination
through various provisions to encourage resource development by
tribes. 127
Among its provisions, the Indian Energy Act establishes a new
office within the Department of Energy, the Office of Indian Energy
Policy and Programs, 28 to promote tribal energy development, to
control energy costs, and to build energy-related infrastructure and
promote electrification on tribal lands. 29 Additionally, the Act
mandates federal assistance for tribal energy development projects
through grant, loan, and loan guarantee programs, 130 to aid in
carrying out projects and in building tribal capacity in the areas of
managerial and technical skills and environmental review processes
and policies. 131 The Act also allows for grants from the DOI to
support tribal regulation of energy resources. 132
The largest section of the Indian Energy Act is devoted to the
new legal framework for leases, business agreements, and rights of
way for energy development or transmission on tribal lands. ' This
new framework aims to address the complexity and delay involved in
the federal approval process for tribal development projects. "' The
Indian Energy Act does not require tribes to adopt this new
framework but rather allows them to continue using the existing legal
framework if they choose to do so. "' However, if a tribe pursues the
new option for energy resource development, the Act allows a tribe
bonds, a modified version of the original clean renewable energy bonds. Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§
1101-1102, 123 Stat. 319-20; § 1111, 123 Stat. 322 (2009).
126. Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 501-506, 119 Stat. at 763-79.
127. This Note presents a brief outline of the provisions; for a more detailed summary, see
Dean Suagee, "Indian Energy" Title of the 2005 Energy Policy Act-An Overview, NATIVE AM.
RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Section of Env't, Energy, and Res., Chi., 111.), May
2007, at 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/nativeamerican/newsletter/
may2007/NativeAmerResMayO7.pdf.
128. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 502, 119 Stat. 763, 763 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7144e).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 503, 119 Stat. 764, 765-67 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3502).
131. Id. at 765-66.
132. Id. at 768 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3503).
133. Id. at 769-76 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3504).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 119-124.
135. Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal Energy Development and
Self-Determination Act; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,808, 12,820 (Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter
Final Rule].
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that gains approval for a master agreement with the Secretary-the
tribal energy resource agreement, or TERA-to enter into leases and
other business arrangements and to grant rights of way across tribal
lands. 136 Once a tribe has obtained a TERA, Secretarial approval is
not needed for these subsequent development agreements. 137
The TERA must include several prescribed provisions. 38 Some
of these provisions address basic elements of a business agreement,
such as its term, methods for amending or renewing it, economic
return, and remedies for breach. "' Other TERA provisions address
the tribe's ability to regulate its agreements and communicate with
interested third parties, such as provisions to ensure that parties to
agreements comply with environmental laws, to allow for public
notification and consultation with states, and to provide information
related to governing tribal law and judicial remedies. ,' The TERA
must also establish an environmental review process for energy
development agreements that addresses environmental effects,
mitigation measures, public notification and comment, and tribal
oversight of development activities. 141 Finally, the TERA must allow
for periodic Secretarial review and evaluation of activities carried out
under the tribe's energy agreements and must authorize the Secretary
to act when needed to resolve a violation of an agreement or of
controlling environmental laws. 142
The Indian Energy Act also sets out provisions governing the
Secretary's consideration, approval, and disapproval of TERAs. "' In
addition, it allows a party that sustains adverse environmental
impacts to petition for Secretarial review of a tribe's compliance with
a TERA, after the party has exhausted available tribal remedies. 144
One subsection refers specifically to the federal trust
responsibility, affirming that the trust responsibility remains in
effect. "' This provision mandates that the Secretary "act in
136. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)-(b).
137. Id. § 3504(a)(2).
138. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
139. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
142. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(D).
143. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(A), (2)(B), (4).
144. Id. § 3504(e)(7).
145. Id. § 3504(e)(6).
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accordance with the trust responsibility of the United States relating
to mineral and other trust resources" and "in good faith and in the
best interests of the Indian tribes." 46 It also notes that with the
exception of the waiver of Secretarial approval allowed through the
TERA framework, the Indian Energy Act does not "absolve the
United States from any responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes,
including ...those which derive from the trust relationship." 147
However, this subsection also limits federal liability for losses
related to agreements tribes enter into pursuant to a TERA. 148
The Act instructs the Secretary to promulgate regulations
implementing the subsection regarding TERAs. "' The Secretary
released the final TERA regulations in March 2008. 15 The
regulations are divided into nine subparts covering general
provisions, application procedures, the approval process, the
implementation of TERAs, interested party petitions regarding
potential environmental damage, Secretarial review, Secretarial
reassumption of responsibilities taken on by a tribe under a TERA,
rescission, and appeal. ' Some of the sections essentially track the
provisions of the Indian Energy Act. 152 Others provide significant
detail regarding the categories of regulation specified in the Act:
criteria for determining a tribe's regulatory capacity, processes and
requirements for rescission of agreements and return of
responsibilities to the Secretary, Secretarial review, and DOI actions
after appeals from a Secretarial determination in response to an
interested party petition have been exhausted. 3
146. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(A).
147. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B).
148. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii) ("[T]he United States shall not be liable to any party (including
any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or any loss resulting from the negotiated terms of, a
lease, business agreement, or right of way executed pursuant to ... a tribal energy resource
agreement .. "); see also supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
149. Id. § 3504(e)(8).
150. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, DOI Publishes Final Regulations on Tribal
Energy Resource Agreements (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.doi.gov/news/08_NewsReleases/
08031 l.html.
151. 25 C.F.R. pt. 224 (2008).
152. See, e.g., id. § 224.63 (detailing provisions that a TERA must contain; the provisions
given under § 2 24.63(c) use language almost identical to that of 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C)).
153. The Indian Energy Act's specific directive regarding regulations to be promulgated
appears at 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(8). The corresponding regulations appear at 25 C.F.R.
§§ 224.72-224.73 (criteria for determining capacity), 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.170-224.175 (rescission),
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In the application and approval process, a tribe must consult
with the director of the Office of Indian Energy and Economic
Development, an office within the DOI, both before and after
submitting an application. ' The DOI must accept public comments
regarding the proposed TERA and may conduct a NEPA review
related to the activities proposed. "' The DOI must approve or
disapprove a proposed TERA within 270 days of receiving an
application. 156 Thus, the total time for the application and approval
process is likely to exceed one year. 157
Thomas H. Shipps, an Indian law practitioner, provided
commentary on the proposed regulations after their publication in
2006. 15 Shipps noted that the regulations generally advance the
Indian Energy Act's goal of tribal self-determination, but he
identified some exceptions."' The most important of these
exceptions is a provision that restricts the scope of TERAs by
excepting "inherently Federal functions" from the activities that a
tribe can assume under a TERA. 160 Shipps's commentary suggests
that this and other provisions of the regulations interfere with tribal
self-determination and discourage tribes from entering into
TERAs. 161 This Note next takes up these concerns as part of an
evaluation of the TERA framework's ability to promote self-
determined wind power development by tribes.
25 C.F.R. §§ 224.130-224.141 (periodic reviews), and 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.100-224.121 (interested
party petitions).
154. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.51, 224.58.
155. Id. § 224.67; see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
156. Id. § 224.74.
157. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1082.
158. Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Commentary on the Proposed
Regulations, NATIVE AM. RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Section of Env't, Energy,
and Res., Chi., Ill.), May 2007, at 2, available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/
committees/nativeamerican/newsletter/may2007/NativeAmerResMay07.pdf [hereinafter Shipps,
Commentary].
159. Id. at 3.
160. 25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c). The DOI has indicated that it would treat this concept as
consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76. Memorandum from
Bureau of Indian Affairs to Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs (Aug.
22, 2008) (on file with author). The circular provides that "inherently governmental activities"
involve "the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures and
processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements." OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-76 (REVISED) A-2
(2003).
161. Shipps, Commentary, supra note 158, at 3-4.
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V. CRITIQUE OF THE TERA FRAMEWORK AS A VEHICLE FOR
SELF-DETERMINED RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Congress and the DOI have stated that one goal of the TERA
legislation and regulations is to make energy resource development
easier and more efficient. '62 Enhancing tribal self-determination is
another often-mentioned goal. 163 To the extent that TERAs eliminate
the middleman role of the federal government, " they accomplish
these goals. However, the Indian Energy Act and its implementing
regulations show a tension between a desire for tribes to manage
resource development independently and a desire for the federal
government to retain control of tribal resource development. The
TERA framework allows the federal government to retain control
over resource development by imposing stringent environmental
review requirements, by using the trust responsibility to justify
federal power, by withholding authority for "inherently Federal
functions," and by dictating the terms of tribal energy development
projects pursuant to TERAs. The ultimate effect is to undermine the
federal commitment to tribal self-determination.
A. Retaining Federal Control over Resource Development
Through Stringent Environmental Review Requirements
A tribe developing resources under a TERA must undertake an
environmental review as provided for in the TERA. 165 This means
that the business arrangement is subject to a tribally established
review process rather than review under NEPA. '66 Some comments
in response to the proposed TERA regulations observed that the
TERA framework requires a more stringent environmental review
than called for under NEPA. 167 After the Indian Energy Act was
162. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,808; see also supra text accompanying notes 119-121
(discussing how the preexisting development framework impedes development).
163. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,808.
164. Andrea S. Miles, Note, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools for Achieving Energy
Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of Federal Environmental and Trust
Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 461, 468 (2006).
165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
166. Miles, supra note 164, at 470. In some circumstances, NEPA review may still apply,
such as if a tribe obtains federal funding for resource development. Telephone Interview with
Robert Gough, Sec'y, Intertribal Council On Util. Policy (Oct. 2-3, 2008) [hereinafter Gough
Interview I]; see also Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-30 (referring to federal approval of
business agreements as "one ground" requiring NEPA review).
167. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,814.
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passed, one commentator noted that state and local governments are
not subject to NEPA review requirements and argued that the TERA
environmental review requirement is "more intrusive on the
government prerogatives of Indian tribes than justified." 168 At the
very least, the environmental review provisions pose a strong
potential for delaying tribal resource development. 169
Congress included the environmental review provisions in the
Indian Energy Act in response to expressions of concern that the
TERA framework would eliminate NEPA review. 170 The extent of
environmental review that should be required was a theme of the
congressional debate when the energy policy legislation was first
considered in 2003. ,71 The final version of the legislation includes
provisions requiring the incorporation of mitigation measures into
development agreements and tribal environmental oversight of
activities by other parties to an agreement. 172 By contrast, NEPA is
considered a procedural statute that does not impose actual
constraints on decisions related to environmental impacts. 173 For
example, though NEPA requires a discussion of mitigation
measures, 174 it includes no requirement that those measures must be
carried out. "' Additionally, the TERA framework requires tribes to
consult with states regarding any off-reservation environmental
impacts. 176 NEPA imposes no corresponding requirement on federal
agencies. In these ways, the TERA requirements go beyond NEPA
requirements.
168. Scot W. Anderson, The Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
of 2005: Opportunities for Cooperative Ventures, NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN
INDIAN COUNTRY (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found., Westminster, Colo.), Nov. 10-11, 2005, at 8-7.
169. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1091.
170. Anderson, supra note 168, at 8-5 to -6.
171. Id. at 8-6.
172. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(ii), (v) (2006).
173. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role
of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 237-38 (1996)
[hereinafter Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy].
174. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f) (2008).
175. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008) (noting that NEPA
aims to ensure that information about mitigation measures be considered but reiterating that
"NEPA imposes only procedural requirements").
176. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(X).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). A somewhat related concern involves the fact that federal
law does not require states to consult with tribes when state development activities create on-
reservation environmental impacts. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1094.
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The Secretary has acknowledged that the TERA environmental
review provisions go beyond what NEPA requires of the federal
government. 178 In the Federal Register preamble (the "Preamble") to
the final TERA regulations, the DOI tied the TERA environmental
review regulations to the mandate articulated in the 2005 Act and
claimed that the Secretary bore responsibility for ensuring that tribal
environmental review processes were sufficient to identify and
address foreseeable environmental impacts. 179 Thus, Congress and
the DOI appear, in the instance of environmental review, to have
bound tribes to a stringent process rather than allowing tribes to
determine for themselves what environmental review process would
be appropriate for development projects they regulate and manage on
their lands.
B. Retaining Federal Control over Resource
Development Through the Trust Responsibility
Another area of concern regarding TERAs is their effect on the
federal trust obligation toward tribes. Of particular concern is the
provision absolving the federal government of liability related to the
negotiated terms of agreements tribes enter into pursuant to a
TERA. "' Some tribal leaders see this limitation of liability as the
government abdicating its trust responsibilities. 181 The possibility
provokes fears that private entities such as energy companies will
exploit tribal resources and take unfair advantage of tribes. 182 On the
other side, some tribes and tribal organizations welcome the
opportunity to use TERAs as a way to develop tribal resources. 183
They stress the fact that entering into a TERA is voluntary and that
the law creating TERAs is, at its essence, about self-determination. 184
Professor Royster notes that "the asymmetry of requiring consultation only one way is
troublesome." Id. at 1095.
178. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,814.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 78-83, 148 and accompanying text.
181. Robert Gehrke, Some Tribes Say Energy Development Measure Goes Too Far,
BISMARCKTRIB. (N.D.), July 31, 2003, at 2C.
182. April Reese, New Federal Law Encourages Tapping of Indian Resources, LAND
LETTER, Dec. 1, 2005.
183. Brenda Norrell, Title V Could Jeopardize Trust Status Protections, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Canastota, N.Y.), Aug. 31, 2005.
184. Gehrke, supra note 181; Reese, supra note 182.
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These two viewpoints capture the complexity of the relationship
between the doctrines of trust and self-determination. 185 The former
viewpoint seeks federal protection at the expense of increased
control over the course of tribal resource development. 186 For some
tribes, such as those with weaker governmental structures, this may
be the best choice. 187 However, the idea of choice is key, as tribes
should be in charge of whether and when to assume control of their
development. 188 The TERA structure is meant to allow this choice
because entering into a TERA is voluntary. 189 Tribes that wish to
remain under federal protection may continue to use the preexisting
system of federal approval for development projects. 190 Thus, the
TERA framework does not weaken the trust responsibility. 191
On the contrary, the federal government uses the trust
responsibility to retain control unnecessarily through the TERA
regulations. The Preamble included a discussion of proposed section
224.115 of the regulations highlighting this tendency. 192 In the
subpart of the regulations that addresses petitions by interested
parties regarding noncompliance with a TERA,193 the DOI's
regulations, as originally proposed, allowed for dismissing such a
petition if the tribe and the petitioner concur in the tribe's proposed
resolution of the petitioner's claim. '9' The following section allowed
185. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
186. See Rosser, supra note 4, at 342.
187. Id. at 344, 350.
188. Id. at 350.
189. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part IV.A.
191. Miles, supra note 164, at 473.
192. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,816.
193. 25 C.F.R. subpt. E, §§ 224.100-224.121 (2008).
194. Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal Energy Development and
Self-Determination Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,626, 48,640 (Aug. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]
(proposed § 224.114). See Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1095-98, for further
discussion of interested party petitions. Professor Royster observes that the petition procedures
may cause delay and added expense in resource development by tribes. Id. at 1096. She also
raises a concern related to the portion of the process prior to a petition to the Secretary, in which a
petitioner pursues tribal remedies. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.100, 224.106, 224.107. Her discussion
suggests that the form of the final regulations may lead to an interpretation in which "a petitioner
must consent in writing to any resolution offered through the tribal administrative or judicial
process," which would "make[] a mockery of the tribal remedies." Royster, Practical
Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1097. Professor Royster proposes that instead the regulations
should be interpreted to apply to the portion of the procedure after a petition has been submitted
to the Secretary, providing "an additional opportunity [for the parties] to resolve the matter." Id.
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the DOI-through the director of the Office of Indian Energy and
Economic Development-to reject a resolution that the tribe and the
petitioner mutually agreed to. "' In the Preamble, the DOI declined to
remove that provision, characterizing it as an expression of the
DOI's "residual trust responsibility." 196 The DOI thus used the trust
obligation as a basis for preserving its control over a tribe's TERA
compliance. This is contrary to the goals of the Indian Energy Act
and undercuts tribal self-determination.
C. Retaining Federal Control over Resource Development
Through the "Inherently Federal Functions " Requirement
Another instance in which the DOI unnecessarily retains control
over the TERA process is its excepting "inherently Federal
functions" from activities that tribes can take on under a TERA. "I
However, this exception is neither included in nor required by the
Indian Energy Act. 198 Thus, the reservation of federal functions
indicates reluctance on the part of the DOI to turn over
administrative activities to tribes. "' The "inherently Federal
functions" exception manifests the federal bureaucracy's resistance
to relinquishing its power over the course of tribal resource
development. 200
The Preamble acknowledged that this exception was a major
issue during the public comment period and discusses why the DOI
included the exception. 201 According to the Preamble, the inclusion
was attributable partly to the trust responsibility toward tribes and
trust assets and partly to the DOI's responsibilities, as spelled out in
195. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,816; Proposed Rule, supra note 194 (proposed
§ 224.115). In Professor Royster's discussion, see supra note 194, the preferred interpretation
allows resolution only if the director concurs in the resolution. Royster, Practical Sovereignty,
supra note 44, at 1097 & n.188.
196. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,816. The DOI revised this section but did not remove
this authority granted to the director. Compare Proposed Rule, supra note 194 (providing the
proposed wording of section 224.115, which allowed for the director to act after rejecting a tribe's
proposed resolution), with 25 C.F.R. § 224.115 (showing the final wording, which still allows the
director to determine whether the tribe successfully resolved a claim and to act after determining
that the tribe did not do so).
197. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
198. Shipps, Commentary, supra note 158, at 3.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
201. Final Rule, supra note 135, 12,809-12,810.
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the Indian Energy Act, to determine a tribe's capacity to carry out
TERA activities and to undertake periodic reviews of a tribe's TERA
activities. 202 The Preamble went on to note that "Congress did not
expressly prohibit the use of the term 'Inherently Federal Functions'
and that this same exception appears in other Indian Affairs
regulations, most notably under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). 203 However, the text of the
ISDEAA explicitly includes the limitation that prevents tribes from
taking on "inherently Federal functions," 204 while the Indian Energy
Act does not. 205 Congress's failure to mention this limitation should
be interpreted as a signal that the limitation should not apply. The
DOI instead used Congress's silence to justify applying the
limitation.
Moreover, in the context of the ISDEAA, a past DOI solicitor
advised the DOI that "there is no clear constitutional limitation or an
independent Secretarial responsibility to withhold delegation of
inherently federal functions from tribes."2 o6 The requirement thus
gives the DOI more control than the Indian Energy Act envisioned
and makes the TERA structure less likely to meet its intended goal of
enabling tribes to independently develop their resources pursuant to
the principle of self-determination. 207
202. Id. at 12,810. The issue of this language came up during a hearing before the Senate
Indian Affairs Committee after the final regulations were published. Senator Byron Dorgan, the
chair of the committee, expressed concern that the requirement in the regulations was undefined.
In response, the director of the Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development reiterated
that the requirement was related to the federal trust responsibility. In answer to Senator Dorgan's
concern about the lack of clarity about this provision, the director said, "We have been in long-
term discussions with tribes . . . to try and delineate what these inherently Federal functions
would be. To be honest, we haven't quite come to completion on our internal thought processes
on that yet." Indian Energy Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th
Cong. 71-72 (2008). Subsequently, the DOI provided a written response to Senator Dorgan's
questions, indicating that it would treat "inherently Federal functions" as consistent with the
defimition of "inherently governmental activities" contained in a circular from the Office of
Management and Budget. See supra note 160.
203. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,810. For information on the ISDEAA, see supra notes
58-60 and accompanying text.
204. Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements Between Native
American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal Self-
Governance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 475, 501 (2007). The Tribal Self-Governance Act
amended the ISDEAA. Id. at 476; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
205. See 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e) (2006).
206. Shipps, Commentary, supra note 158, at 3.
207. Id.
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D. Retaining Federal Control over Resource Development
by Dictating the Terms of TERA Development
In addition to the specific weaknesses discussed above, the
TERA framework is flawed more generally as an attempt to promote
tribal self-interest. The framework allows tribes to enter into resource
development agreements without Secretarial approval, but only on
terms dictated by the federal government rather than on the tribes'
own terms. 208
The federal government sets the terms of resource development
agreements through its extensive legislative and regulatory
requirements for TERAs and for agreements forged pursuant to
TERAs. First, the Indian Energy Act dictates the required terms of
TERAs in great detail. 209 Among the requirements, tribes must allow
the Secretary to review their performance under a TERA. 210 These
reviews must occur annually for the first three years and thereafter at
least biannually. 2 Thus, the legislation both specifies the form of a
TERA and requires constant federal oversight after the DOI approves
a tribe's TERA.
Second, federal control over TERA approval and review is
substantial. 2' The approval process involves extensive consultation
and a lengthy time for application review. 213 There is also a broad set
of regulations for Secretarial review of a tribe's compliance with its
TERA. 24 Thus, the TERA framework has changed the federal role in
tribal resource development without necessarily reducing it or
shifting true control to tribes. 215
208. See Porter, supra note 72, at 967 (noting that under the self-determination policy, the
federal government makes decisions about policies and programs).
209. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
210. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(D).
211. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(E).
212. See supra notes 143, 151-57 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
214. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.100-224.141 (2008).
215. See Porter, supra note 72, at 964-69 (discussing a similar pattern with the BIA retaining
power and micromanaging tribal activities under the ISDEAA); Royster, Practical Sovereignty,
supra note 44, at 1070 (noting that the ISDEAA framework does not allow tribes to choose the
programs and development opportunities they would like to pursue).
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VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL TRIBAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT POLICY
In its present form, the TERA structure does not fully meet its
asserted goal of promoting self-determination. 216 However,
possibilities exist for using TERAs to get closer to achieving this
goal. The first of these involves finding an opportunity for resource
development that can take advantage of the TERA structure. Wind
can provide that opportunity. The second involves making changes to
the TERA framework to enhance tribal control over resource
development.
A. Wind Power TERA as an Opportunity to Put
the TERA Framework into Practice
The foregoing discussion casts into relief the difficulty involved
in enabling tribes to take control of the development of their natural
resources. The solution involves not only creating a successful legal
framework for resource development but also finding a way to put
that framework into practice. Therefore, whether TERAs can
facilitate self-determined resource development may center on how
successfully tribes can use them. Wind power presents advantages
over conventional resource development and offers prospects for
putting TERAs into practice.
Because the TERA regulations were promulgated only
recently, 217 it is too soon to know how broadly TERAs will be
used. 218 Some experts suggest that the process of securing a TERA
may be so burdensome that many tribes will choose not to seek a
TERA. 219 Indeed, the long, multistep application process can be a
hurdle for tribes that want to move forward quickly with
development plans. 220
216. See supra Part V.
217. The final regulations appeared in the Federal Register on March 10, 2008, and went into
effect on April 9, 2008. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,808.
218. The Indian Energy Act provided that tribes could apply for a TERA when regulations
were promulgated. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(1) (2006). More than a year after the regulations were
released, no applications had yet been submitted. Telephone Interview with Darryl Frangois,
Chief, Div. of Indian Energy Policy Dev., Office of Indian Energy & Econ. Dev., Bureau of
Indian Affairs (Aug. 13, 2009).
219. Vollman, supra note 121, at 4.
220. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, only a few tribes may presently be in a position to
successfully apply for a TERA, based on their level of expertise in
regulating and carrying out resource development projects. 221 The
Indian Energy Act includes provisions to build tribes' regulatory and
management capacity, 222 but the capacity-building process will take
time, and generally, congressional appropriations have not provided
the necessary financial resources for wide use of these provisions. 223
However, the underlying assumption of much discussion
regarding TERAs is that energy resource development takes the form
of mineral development. 224 A TERA related to mineral energy
development will require a level of knowledge that most likely
entails significant experience with such development projects. 225 The
number of tribes in this position, as noted previously, appears quite
small. For one thing, fossil fuel development creates significant
environmental impacts, requiring a robust environmental review
process. 226 Also, carrying out large energy development projects
requires management, technical, and regulatory capacity, 22' as well
221. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1083 ("Few tribes at present have the
in-house geologists, engineers, hydrologists, and other experts . . . to provide the tribe with
accurate and reliable information about its energy resources and the environmental and financial
impacts of resource decisions."); Gough Interview I, supra note 166 (suggesting that TERAs may
be useful for a few tribes for large projects); Telephone Interview with Thomas H. Shipps,
Partner, Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel (Gen. Counsel to Southern Ute Indian Tribe) (Sept.
24, 2008) (identifying three tribes with probable capacity to enter into TERAs for energy
development).
222. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
223. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1084-85. Royster notes that the lack of
federal resources may lead to a "haves-and-have-nots situation" in which some tribes are able to
take advantage of the TERA framework, while others must use the preexisting framework
involving Secretarial approval of resource development agreements. Id. at 1085 n. 115. For further
information on federal appropriations related to American Indian programs and services, see
National Congress of American Indians, Appropriations, http://www.ncai.org/Federal-
Appropriations.87.0.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
224. See Anderson, supra note 168, at 8-14 (noting that the Indian Energy Act "is intended to
attract mineral development to Indian Country").
225. Id. at 8-16.
226. 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman) (quoting a letter from
state attorneys general urging that "significant energy development activity on tribal lands
continue[] to be subject to meaningful environmental review"); id. at S7689 (statement of Sen.
Jim Jeffords) (asserting the need for a strong environmental review in the face of possible
"massive energy development on tribal lands" with "potentially massive environmental
impacts").
227. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-474, pt. 8, at 93-95 (1992).
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as access to significant capital. 22' These limitations partly explain a
continuing trend under policies meant to encourage tribal self-
determination: most large-scale mineral development projects are
carried out by non-Indian companies pursuant to leases. 229 The
concern about the weakening of the trust relationship may also be
implicated in mineral development, because the danger of permanent
harm to tribal natural resources and the potential long-term nature of
some mineral development agreements make tribes wary of the
consequences of entering into such projects. 230
Wind power, however, can provide an opportunity for TERAs to
fulfill their potential despite these limitations. For renewable energy
projects tapping wind power, the concerns about business capacity,
regulatory structures, environmental review, capital, and the trust
relationship are reduced. 231
Environmental impacts for wind power projects are greatly
lessened in comparison with those associated with mineral
development. 232 Thus, tribes are much more likely to have the
capacity to undertake the environmental review required for a wind
project than the review required for a conventional power plant. 233
Additionally, wind projects lend themselves to a modular approach
that is impractical for fossil fuel development. For example,
construction of a coal plant must take place as a single-typically
500- to 1,000-megawatt-project, whereas it is possible to build a
wind power project in stages. 234 This modular approach provides an
228. Coal plant construction typically requires more than $1 billion in capital. See, e.g., Tim
Craig & Sandhya Somaskehkar, Dominion Gets Initial Approval for Coal Plant, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 2008, at B02 (discussing construction of a $1.8 billion plant); Tom Fowler, Company Is
Stepping Back from Coal Gasification Plant, HOUSTON CHRON., June 14, 2007, Business sec., at
3 (discussing a 600-megawatt coal plant's projected $1.5 billion cost).
229. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1071.
230. Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-39 (noting that mineral development depletes
irreplaceable resources and can permanently change the land on a reservation). The TERA
legislation allows a tribe to enter into a lease or a business agreement related to oil or gas
resources for "10 years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities."
25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
231. Gough Interview I, supra note 166.
232. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
233. Gough Interview I, supra note 166.
234. BUSCH ET AL., supra note 101, at 56; Gough Interview I, supra note 166 (suggesting that
a wind power project can be developed in 10- to 50-megawatt "modules").
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opportunity to observe and mitigate impacts as the project
progresses, creating a streamlined process. 235
A wind power TERA also is largely free from concerns about
erosion of the trust responsibility, both because the environmental
impacts are less and because the duration of a business agreement
pursuant to a TERA is limited to thirty years. 236 Moreover, a wind
power TERA may reduce the government's concern with
relinquishing control to tribes and may ease the transition of
regulatory activity to tribes: because of the lesser impacts and
reduced need for regulatory capacity, the risks are lower, and the
DOI can have greater confidence in leaving control in tribes'
hands. 237
Thus, wind power projects appear to be particularly well suited
for the TERA structure. Wind power should be at the center of
attempts to promote the use of TERAs by tribes seeking to undertake
self-determined development. 238
However, the use of TERAs for wind power development raises
a question regarding the proper entity to enter into a TERA. Though
a single tribe may not be the best entity to develop a wind power
project, the TERA framework directs that "an Indian tribe" can apply
for and enter into a TERA with the Secretary-that is, a single tribe
is the TERA entity. 239 For many resource development purposes, this
is the most suitable arrangement, because the TERA structure
envisions that the tribe will be the regulatory body for development
on its lands.
Wind, however, has the disadvantage of intermittency. 24
Wind's intermittent nature raises concerns about the need for power
235. Gough Interview I, supra note 166.
236. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). Renewals are allowed, however. Id. § 3504(c).
237. See Shaw & Deutsch, supra note 4, at 9-15.
238. However, Robert Gough, a leading advocate for tribal wind energy, suggests that though
the TERA structure can reduce some obstacles to wind development, projects that link to the
federal transmission grid still implicate significant federal participation. Telephone Interview with
Robert Gough, Sec'y, Intertribal Council On Util. Policy (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Gough
Interview II]. This means that though wind power may be especially suitable for a TERA, a
TERA may not advance wind power development as much as it might be able to with additional
reforms to streamline tribal wind projects connecting to the federal grid. Such reforms are outside
the scope of this Note.
239. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e).
240. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 526.
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from other sources to supplement wind power. 241 This drawback
reduces wind's market value. 242 Additionally, existing grid-
connection and pricing policies disadvantage intermittent power
producers.243 Interconnecting geographically dispersed turbines
compensates for the wind's variability and can make the power
source more reliable. 244 For these reasons, wind power projects can
benefit from a design in which wind farms are spread over a broad
geographic area. 245
To allow for the necessary dispersal, a tribal wind power project
would gain from locating turbines on several reservations.246
However, with a project involving several reservations, the current
TERA framework would require each tribe involved to enter into a
separate TERA with the Secretary. 247 This would create a significant
administrative impediment to a wind power project involving several
tribes, as each tribe's TERA would require a lengthy application
process. 248
Other sections of the Indian Energy Act allow a tribal energy
resource development organization-an organization including at
least one tribe-to receive grants, loans, and other federal
assistance. 249 Such an organization can be an important entity in
wind power development because of the advantages of dispersal.
Therefore, the TERA framework should be revised to allow a tribal
energy resource development organization, rather than a single tribe,
to enter into a TERA. Appropriate limits can be placed on the kind of
organization that may enter into a TERA, such as requiring that it
include only tribes, and on the kinds of projects that the organization
241. Id. The required supplemental power is known as "reserve" power. See id.
242. Christina L. Archer & Mark Z. Jacobson, Supplying Baseload Power and Reducing
Transmission Requirements by Interconnecting Wind Farms, 46 J. APPLIED METEOROLOGY &
CLIMATOLOGY 1701, 1701 (2007).
243. Newman, supra note 16, at 7; see also Matthew L. Wald, Wind Power Is Becoming a
Better Bargain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, § 1, at 27.
244. Archer & Jacobson, supra note 242, at 1702. Interconnection allows wind power projects
to provide what is known as "baseload," or guaranteed, power. Id. at 1716. It also allows lower
installed long-distance transmission capacity, which reduces the cost of delivering power to
distant end users, reducing the overall cost of wind energy. Id. at 1710, 1716.
245. Wald, supra note 243.
246. Gough Interview I, supra note 166.
247. See 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e) (2006).
248. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
249. 25 U.S.C. § 3501(11).
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can develop under a TERA, such as limiting it to developing a single
energy resource. Allowing a tribal energy resource development
organization to be the TERA entity would streamline the approval
process and facilitate development of wind power on tribal lands.
One example of a potential organization that could take advantage of
the TERA structure is one composed of tribal members of the
Intertribal Council On Utility Policy (COUP). 250 COUP represents
member tribes located in the Northern Great Plains, a region with
great wind power potential. 251 This organization has been
investigating the possibility of a distributed wind power project with
turbines on several reservations. 252 Allowing the participating tribes
to enter into a single TERA through a tribal energy resource
development organization might streamline the development of this
project.
B. Changes to Increase Tribal Control over Development
Encouraging wind power development through TERAs and
allowing tribal energy resource development organizations to enter
into TERAs will go far in increasing the use of wind energy and in
fostering self-determination in tribal resource development. But
additional changes to the TERA framework will also help in meeting
these goals. The key changes that are needed include revisions to
remove the "inherently Federal functions" requirement, to grant
tribes greater discretion in environmental review, to align the
assertions of the federal trust responsibility with the goal of self-
determination, and to encourage direct tribal participation in
development projects.
First, the exception for "inherently Federal functions" should be
removed from the TERA regulations. "' This exception was not
mandated by the legislation and is not necessary to the TERA
250. COUP "provide[s] policy analysis and recommendations, as well as workshops.., with
a heavy emphasis on wind energy development." Intertribal Council On Utility Policy Mission
Statement, http://www.intertribalcoup.org/mission/index.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
251. Gough, supra note 11, at 57; see also supra text accompanying note 28.
252. Gough, supra note 11, at 62. The article discusses a project involving up to eight
reservations. Id. More recently, COUP has been considering expanding the project to additional
reservations, and it is exploring the potential for wind power on more than twenty reservations in
the Upper Great Plains region. Gough Interview I, supra note 166; Gough Interview I, supra
note 238.
253. See supra Part V.C.
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framework. 254 TERA approval already calls for an extensive
consultation process between a tribe and the DOI, during which the
parties can identify which aspects of development regulation the
tribe can reasonably undertake. 255 In arguing for the "inherently
Federal functions" provision, the DOI itself recognized that the
consultation process would allow the tribe and the DOI to agree
about the scope of a TERA. 256
The decision not to transfer responsibility to the tribe can be
made during the consultation process if an activity is truly the
province of the federal government (for example, an activity that
binds the federal government to take a particular action). 257
Protecting the federal government's sphere of action is a legitimate
concern, but the government's default posture should be to grant
control to tribes to better fulfill the self-determination principle. 258
Removing the "inherently Federal functions" provision will help
shift the presumption from the federal government retaining control
over resource development to tribes taking over that control.
Second, the environmental review requirements in the Indian
Energy Act should be revised to allow tribes more discretion in how
they approach environmental issues. Where the TERA framework
requires more stringent review than would apply under NEPA, 259 it
should be altered to allow tribes greater flexibility. Congress created
the TERA environmental review requirements because of concern
that tribes would not protect the environment as well as the federal
government would under NEPA. 260 However, scholars of tribal
attitudes toward the environment suggest that tribes generally place
value on environmental protection and that tribal environmental
review would likely not be weaker than NEPA review. 2 61 Some
254. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
255. 26 C.F.R. § 224.51 (2008) (describing the consultation to take place before a tribe
submits an application); id. § 224.58 (describing the consultation to take place after a tribe
submits an application).
256. Final Rule, supra note 135, at 12,813.
257. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 160.
258. See Porter, supra note 72, at 966-67.
259. See supra notes 116-18, 172-79 and accompanying text.
260. Anderson, supra note 168, at 8-6; see also text accompanying note 170.
261. See William H. Rodgers Jr., Tribal Government Roles in Environmental Federalism,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2007, at 3, 5; Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Self-Determination and
Environmental Federalism: Cultural Values as a Force for Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP.
J. 229, 233-34 (1998); Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy, supra note 173, at 330-31; see also
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tribes have already voluntarily adopted environmental policy acts
comparable to NEPA. 262 Their reasons for doing so include a desire
to meaningfully consider concerns about "environmental, cultural,
historical, and ecological factors" and a desire to preserve the
reservation land base for future generations. 263
Indeed, environmental review is best viewed as a decision-
making tool rather than as a compliance hurdle. 264 For example,
preparation of an environmental assessment during planning is
advisable even when not required for NEPA compliance, because an
assessment can help in identifying and mitigating environmental
impacts. 265 Because tribes rely on their land base and resources, 266
they have strong incentives to approach environmental review in this
light.
For this reason, the shift from federal environmental review
under NEPA to tribal environmental review under the TERA
structure would be a positive step that would improve the
environmental review process and avoid the conflicts of interest
inherent in federal environmental review. 267 Additionally, the
principle of self-determination suggests that tribes should be able to
control the procedures of environmental protection, based on their
own values, while engaging in resource development on their
lands.2 68 But to accomplish this, the TERA framework should
increase flexibility for environmental review rather than specifying
the form of that review, as it presently does. 269
Getches, Foreword, supra note 38, at xv ("For many tribal peoples, a sense of mutuality and
interdependence between humans and the rest of nature ensures that resources will be treated with
stewardship. Used . . . thoughtfully, gratefully, and in ways that preserve their availability so
future generations can endure on the land.").
262. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1093.
263. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id. at 1091; Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Environmental Policy Acts and the TEPA Template
Policy, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY Dec. 13-14, 2001; see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY § 1:14(B) (2008).
265. Gough, supra note 11, at 62. See Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 530-31, for a discussion
of environmental impacts of wind power projects.
266. Clow & Sutton, supra note 35, at xxxvi.
267. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
268. See Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy, supra note 173, at 232, 330.
269. "The shift to a tribal environmental review process ensures that comments will be
reviewed in light of tribal values, priorities, and decisions, rather than filtered through a federal
lens." Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1092. It is certainly true that the shift
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Third, the sections of the legislation and regulations relating to
the trust responsibility should be modified to better accord with the
principle of self-determination. 270 The foremost concern is that the
government uses the trust responsibility to retain control of tribal
resource development, contrary to the principle of self-
determination. 27, The regulations regarding interested party petitions
are a case in point: when an interested party brings a claim that a
tribe did not comply with a TERA, the regulations allow the
Secretary to reject a tribe's resolution of the claim. 272 This amounts
to the government second-guessing tribes, even though the TERA
framework and the Indian Energy Act in general purport to foster
tribes' ability to control their natural resource development activities
under the self-determination principle. The portions of the legislation
and regulations that enable such Secretarial second-guessing should
be revised to guide the Secretary instead to view the trust
responsibility as a duty to protect tribes' right to self-
determination. 273
In addition, changes to the legislation's trust provisions can
allow the provisions to better foster self-determination. The
provision related to the trust obligation with respect to physical
assets allows federal assertion of control at the expense of tribal self-
determination. 274 This provision should be removed or revised in
order to clarify that the Indian Energy Act does not authorize such
control. The provision related to the trust obligation toward
individual Indians and tribes should also be revised, to direct that it
should be interpreted to require federal protection and
encouragement of self-determination. 275
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the concerns expressed
about the government abdicating its trust obligation276  are
unwarranted-the government has more of a tendency to use the
from review carried out by federal agencies to review carried out by tribes will entail a shift in
perspective. However, the strictures of the TERA framework impede that shift in perspective.
270. See supra Part V.B.
271. See Tsosie, Conflict, supra note 66, at 275 (discussing the federal government's
historical use of the trust doctrine to justify federal power over tribes).
272. 25 C.F.R. § 224.115(b) (2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 193-196.
273. See Tsosie, Conflict, supra note 66, at 274.
274. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A)(i) (2006); see also supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
275. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B); see also Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-32.
276. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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trust doctrine to retain control over tribal resource development.
TERA advocates who emphasize that TERAs are voluntary
recognize the importance of focusing more on the opportunity for
self-determined resource development than on the security afforded
by the federal trust obligation. 277 Thus, the provision limiting federal
liability does not require revision,278 for two main reasons.
One reason revision is not needed is that the Indian Energy
Act's explicit recognition of the trust responsibility offers assurance
that this responsibility remains intact. 279 The Act can be compared
with the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982.280 Professor
Judith V. Royster asserts that in that Act, Congress intended to
sustain the trust responsibility despite the inclusion of a similar
limitation on federal liability. 281 Though Professor Royster expresses
some reservations based on differences between the Indian Mineral
Development Act and the Indian Energy Act, she ultimately
concludes that the concerns about the trust responsibility are
unfounded. 282
Another reason the limitation on federal liability does not need
to be changed is that tribes must be willing to take responsibility
when assuming control over resource development. The TERA
framework envisions a process in which the Secretary no longer
approves specific development agreements. 283 It is sensible not to
require that the federal government be liable for damages related to
such agreements. 284 More importantly, it is in tribes' own interests to
accept the risks attendant to developing their resources. 285 Freedom
277. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
278. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii); see supra text accompanying note 148.
279. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
280. Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (1982) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108).
281. Royster, Equivocal Obligations, supra note 86, at 337-38; Royster, Practical
Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1099.
282. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1099-100. The issue arises because the
Indian Mineral Development Act prescribes factors that the Secretary must consider in approving
development agreements, while the Indian Energy Act sidesteps the approval process and thus
does not create a standard for Secretarial action to which the government might be held in an
action for breach of trust. Id.
283. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
284. See Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-24 (noting that where the federal government does
not have legal authority over tribal programs and policies, the government should not be held
liable for damages).
285. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 32, at 45.
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from government control necessarily entails forgoing some federal
protection. 286 The Indian Energy Act includes several provisions to
build tribal capacity to take on development projects. 287 Tribes must
evaluate when their capacity enables them to use a TERA to take
control over resource development. They have the ability to opt in or
remain under the preexisting framework for development, with
federal approval and greater federal oversight and responsibility. 288
When they do take control, they should embrace the attendant risks,
because "sovereignty without such risks is a contradiction in
terms." 289
A fourth change that should be made to the TERA structure is
that it should be reworked to encourage direct tribal participation in
development projects. Though the Indian Energy Act's asserted aim
is to allow tribes to take control of development on their lands, in
reality the TERA legislation is geared more toward having tribes take
over the regulatory role of the federal government, while private
development is still the most likely medium through which resource
development will take place. 290 Because research has suggested that
economic development is more successful when tribes are actively
involved, 29' this model should be rethought. In part, rethinking the
tribe-as-regulator model will involve considering whether the TERA
framework works to enable truly self-determined resource
development by tribes. The framework has been called a "guarded
effort" to allow tribes to determine the course of resource
development on their lands. 292 But a guarded effort may not be
enough to foster real self-determination.
In fact, the TERA legislation and regulations specify in great
detail the provisions that a tribe's TERA and its subsequent
286. Rosser, supra note 4, at 352.
287. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
288. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1101; see supra text accompanying
notes 189-190.
289. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 32, at 45.
290. Gough Interview I, supra note 166.
291. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Getches, Foreword, supra note 38, at
xiv ("[S]uccessful resource management on reservations is linked to Indian control."); Cornell &
Kalt, supra note 32, at 44 ("Each present instance of substantial and sustained economic
development in Indian Country is accompanied by a transfer of primary decision-making control
to tribal hands .... ").
292. Shipps, Step, supra note 121, at 57.
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development agreements must contain. 293 This high level of federal
regulation appears logically inconsistent with real tribal control over
economic and resource development. 294 The issue at the heart of self-
determination is tribes' right to make their own laws and govern
themselves. 295 When the federal government dictates the terms under
which tribes can take control over resource development, this right
remains unfulfilled.
As noted previously, much of the concern over TERAs for
natural resource development arose in the context of mineral
resources, because of the high potential for adverse impacts resulting
from their development. 296 But because wind power does not share
this potential, 297 it can provide an opening for a less rigid structure
than the present TERA framework allows. Given the imperative to
develop wind power, now may be the perfect time to consider this
possibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
Indian tribes and the DOI should view the TERA framework as
providing an opportunity for tribes to take charge of resource
development when their capacity is sufficiently advanced. Because
of its lesser environmental impacts, wind power provides a
significant opportunity for tribes to use TERAs to step into an active
development role.
Not only do the characteristics of wind power make it
particularly well suited for use of the TERA structure, but wind
power is also particularly appropriate for development by a tribal
energy resource development organization made up of several tribes.
Allowing a tribal energy resource development organization to enter
into a wind power TERA would enable the development of this
renewable resource through large-scale projects that can help meet
the nation's energy needs in a sustainable way and also help meet
tribes' needs for sustainable economic development.
293. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii) (2006); 25 C.F.R. pt. 224 (2008); see supra Part V.D.
294. Rosser, supra note 4, at 323 n.208. For a discussion of some possible legislative "fixes"
and "overhauls" that could encourage tribal economic development in general, see EagleWoman,
Tribal Nation Economics, supra note 100, at 424-26.
295. Laurence, supra note 52, at 50.
296. See supra notes 170-71, 230 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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In addition, a wind power TERA provides an opportunity for
tribes to have an ownership interest in the development of their
resources rather than remaining only regulators of development
undertaken by others. 298 This ownership enables tribes to take greater
control over development projects, thereby furthering the goal of
self-determination.
Finally, TERAs enhance self-determination by giving tribes the
power of choice over development decisions. 299 Because the TERA
structure is a voluntary framework for development, tribes can
choose to use this tool or to forgo it in favor of the preexisting, more
protective framework. Moreover, TERAs allow tribes to choose
tribal control, and thus self-determination, in place of federal
protection under the trust doctrine. 300 There may be less need for a
robust trust doctrine after the past several decades, in which the self-
determination principle has influenced federal Indian policy and has
led to greater tribal autonomy-and through the choice TERAs offer,
they can be seen as harmonizing the trust obligation with that present
reality. 30
However, it is worth considering whether the TERA framework
goes far enough in fostering self-determination. Making some
changes to the TERA structure, as this Note suggests, can help tribes
achieve the goal of developing wind power in a self-determined way.
But now may be the time to make broader changes to the federal
legal framework that governs tribal resource development, to truly
unleash the power of tribal wind.
298. Gough Interview I, supra note 166 ("With renewables, tribes can do it themselves.").
299. Rosser, supra note 4, at 351-52.
300. Id.; Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1101.
301. Chambers, supra note 49, at 13A-37.
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